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Abstract— Secure communication is an important aspect of any 
network and it has largely remained unexplored in wireless 
sensor networks (WSN). Security becomes a major challenge 
because of ad-hoc and resource constrained nature of sensor 
networks. In this paper we present a scalable and distributed 
security protocol, DSPS, for WSN that fits in between the 
network and the transport layers. DSPS satisfies the essential 
requirements of secure communication such as Data 
Confidentiality, Data Authentication, Data Integrity and Data 
Freshness. Basic building blocks of our security protocol are Key 
Generation-Distribution and Signatures. The key is a 56-bit 
random number generated initially by a key server, which is then 
securely distributed to all the nodes in the cluster. This key is 
used for encryption. DSPS also supports security critical 
transactions by dynamically generating a key, which can be 
shared between two nodes. The simplicity of DSPS allows 
compatibility with most of the routing protocols.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
Providing secure communication becomes a major concern 
when hundreds to thousands of smart sensors are envisioned to 
be deployed in hostile environments. Currently, these self-
organizing wireless sensor networks (WSN or sensornets) are 
severely resource constrained (limited power, memory and 
processor speeds). Achieving security for these sensornets is 
thus a challenging task. Researchers have so far mainly focused 
on making WSN feasible, useful, robust and reliable. Only a 
few researchers have considered the secure communication 
aspects in WSN. Existing proposals for WSN security 
protocols like SPINS [1] take a centralized approach. SPINS 
relies heavily on a powerful base station and assumes that this 
base station cannot be compromised. In this paper, we propose 
a new security protocol, namely DSPS – a Distributed Security 
Protocol for Sensornets, which is distributed and does not 
depend on the availability of a powerful base station. Our 
distributed security protocol fits in between the network and 
the transport layers. 
Basic building blocks of DSPS are Key Generation-
Distribution and Signatures. A WSN is typically composed of 
many clusters. Each cluster of sensor nodes uses DSPS 
independently of each other. The proposed DSPS uses 
symmetric cryptographic algorithms with key distribution 
within a cluster. All the nodes within a cluster share a common 
key and different clusters use different keys. The key is a 56-bit 
random number generated initially by a key server, which is 
then securely distributed to all the nodes of the cluster. DSPS 
provides the essential requirements of secure communication 
such as Data Confidentiality, Data Authentication, Data 
Integrity and Data Freshness. The simplicity of DSPS allows 
compatibility with most of the routing protocols. 
Asymmetric key cryptography is expensive for sensornets 
in terms of computation and energy consumption. Whereas 
using efficient symmetric key cryptography is more feasible. 
For symmetric encryption algorithms, we mainly have three 
choices, DES [3], TEA [4] and RC5 [5]. The S-box and entry 
tables of DES at every sensor node of WSN do not currently 
seem feasible. While a very attractive choice, TEA has not 
gone through a thorough cryptanalysis yet. Hence the 
alternative we choose is RC5. But it is possible to attack RC5 
with brute-force. As can be seen later, we can overcome this 
limitation by changing the key periodically. The 56-bit key 
used for RC5 is common to the whole cluster and is generated 
initially by the key server (i.e., one of the sensor nodes). This 
key is then distributed to all the nodes of the cluster in a secure 
way. We define an epoch to be the duration for which a 
particular key is used. We use a Hughes’s variant of Diffie-
Hellman algorithm [6] with Encrypted Key Exchange [7] 
(HDH-EKE) for propagating the key at the start of an epoch. 
At the end of an epoch a successive key will be generated on 
all the nodes using a one-way function [8]. So DSPS runs 
HDH-EKE only at the start when sensor nodes are deployed 
and network is formed. 
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we 
discuss our assumptions that guide the design of DSPS to 
provide various security features. Sections III and IV give a 
brief outline of the DSPS. Building blocks and more details of 
DSPS are given in section V. In section VI we list advantages 
of DSPS and then compare it with SPINS in section VII. Due 
to space limitations, discussion of related work other than 
SPINS is omitted from this paper. Reader is referred to [10, 11, 
12, 13, 14, 15] for details. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Wireless communication is fundamentally broadcast in 
nature so the DSPS design guards against an adversary who 
can eavesdrop on the traffic; inject new messages; alter 
messages in transit or replay old messages. DSPS does not trust communication infrastructure. But we assume that network 
layer is reliable. 
Security should not be overkill. In order to make 
communication faster and cheaper or to facilitate specific 
application development, one may assume a specific 
communication pattern. However, to design a generic security 
protocol, it is not desirable to assume any specific 
communication pattern, e.g. a general communication pattern 
of node to base-station and an occasional node-to-node 
communication as in SPINS. (We do note that mainly a node to 
base-station communication assumption allows certain 
advantages in SPINS over DSPS. We will discuss that later in 
sections VI and VII. Furthermore, exploiting specific 
communication patterns may provide additional security 
features, however, that is beyond the scope of this paper). 
Directed Diffusion [9] enables energy-efficient and robust data 
dissemination in dynamic sensor networks. Its event driven 
dynamic path discovery requires efficient and quick local 
communication. For local node-to-node communication 
contacting base station most of the time is not always desirable 
or does not always seem feasible especially when sensor nodes 
are to collaborate together and engage in in-network 
processing. It may deplete the energy of the intermediate nodes 
on the path to a base station if routing is not strongly energy 
aware or not application-specific, which will ultimately 
decrease the lifetime of the network. There is also a risk of 
network partition. Therefore one would not like, in general, to 
assume any specific communication pattern. DSPS design thus 
attempts to assume no specific communication pattern. 
Since WSN is a distributed system and due to envisioned 
deployments of WSNs, synchronizing sensor node clocks will 
be a costly affair. An algorithm that depends on time 
synchronization is prone to failure in case there is a significant 
clock skew. Hence we do not assume sensor nodes to be time-
synchronized. 
With large-scale deployment of the tiny resource-
constrained nodes, classification and clustering based on 
geographical boundaries or their functionality is inevitable. So 
we assume that a network is formed of one or more clusters. 
There are various kinds of attacks one can imagine. We say 
a node is physically compromised when someone has physical 
access to it and they can extract data from it. This is one of the 
most dangerous attacks and nobody can prevent this unless 
sensor nodes are, for example, self-destroying (via hardware or 
software when tampered with). Furthermore, in order for new 
sensor nodes to join the network or to support mobility, some 
sort of trust has to be placed in the valid sensor nodes; e.g. 
assuming availability of a confidential information which is 
known only to designers of the system and if a sensor node gets 
physically compromised then this information is destroyed 
during the breach of trust. This question needs much 
fundamental research and is beyond the scope of this paper. On 
the other hand, to make any progress, we need to place some 
trust somewhere. We thus assume that sensor nodes are not 
physically compromised and if they are then they self-destroy 
(hardware or software-wise). 
Since a key server generates a new key at the end of every 
epoch, we assume that a key server is not compromised during 
this time period. 
All the nodes have Diffie-Hellman constants g and n 
hardwired in them. These constants can be public. The nodes 
also have a hardwired password P that is a secret (the 
confidential information as discussed earlier). A physically 
compromised node poses a threat to a cluster if it has a shared 
secret. As mentioned earlier, if new nodes are to join a network 
dynamically then there need to be some shared secret for 
authentication. P is such secret. We take care of protecting P by 
never using it directly in any communication operation. 
Although RC5 is tested and found to be quite robust we 
assume that it takes some finite amount of time T to crack a 
cryptographic algorithm like RC5. The time to replace old key 
will depend on T. An epoch is a time interval for which a key is 
in use in DSPS and is directly proportional to T. Random keys 
used for RC5 along with the key server are changed for the 
next epoch. 
III. 
IV. 
NOTATIONS 
We use the following notations to describe DSPS in this 
paper. 
EK(R) denotes an encryption of message R with key K. 
DK(Q) denotes message obtained by decrypting Q with key 
K. We have DK(EK(R))=R because of symmetric key 
cryptography. 
S | T denotes concatenation of messages S and T. 
% denotes modulus operation. 
Kn denotes Key for n
th epoch. 
F (P, Q) is a one-way function where P and Q are integers. 
OUTLINE OF DSPS 
Each cluster has a designated key server. The key server 
generates a random key and distributes it securely to all the 
nodes in the cluster. All the nodes in a cluster use the same key 
to encrypt or decrypt messages. At the start of a new epoch the 
key server initiates generation and distribution of a new key. 
DSPS changes keys after an epoch expires. Epoch depends on 
the strength of a cryptographic algorithm. The key server also 
keeps track of time. The key server can be rotated so that the 
network lifetime is increased. 
For our discussion, DSPS uses RC5 as a cryptographic 
algorithm (one can replace RC5 with any other reasonable 
symmetric key cryptography algorithm). All the messages are 
encrypted using RC5, which provides data confidentiality. 
There can be some nodes, which may be on the boundary of 
two or more clusters. Those nodes will have keys of all the 
clusters to which they belong. While sending packet from 
cluster 1 to cluster 2 they first decrypt a message with the key 
of cluster 1, encrypt with the key of cluster 2 and forward it. 
(See Figure 1)  
Figure 1.  
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Different clusters have different keys. The nodes common to two 
or more clusters have keys of all the clusters to which they belong. 
Each packet has a unique encrypted Signature attached with 
data. Signature provides data authentication, data integrity and 
data freshness. 
DSPS supports intercluster and intracluster movement of 
nodes. DSPS also allows new nodes to join network. 
A compromised key will compromise the entire cluster till a 
new key is set up. We next describe the details of DSPS. 
DSPS BUILDING BLOCKS 
Key Generation 
The current key server will generate a key. All the nodes 
have Diffie-Hellman constants g and n hardwired in them, 
which could be public. They also have a shared secret 
password P. Initially when network is deployed the key server 
generates a random number x and computes the key K= g
x %n. 
The key server will keep track of time to find when an 
epoch expires. After expiration of an epoch a new key is to be 
generated. It will send a broadcast message asking nodes to 
compute new key using one-way function. In a broadcast 
message it will send a random number Counter. Counter along 
with P will be the arguments to a one-way function F which 
will produce password P’= F (Counter, P). P’ will be used 
only once. New key K’ is generated from P’, the previous key 
K and one-way function F as K’= F (K, P’). 
New keys may be generated on different nodes at slightly 
different global time. There may be a case that two neighboring 
nodes are using different keys at the same time. DSPS 
addresses this issue by sending the current epoch number with 
every packet. So if node A is using key K5 and sends message 
to node B that is using K10, B will send a message to A that it is 
using an outdated key. Then A has to join the cluster again as a 
new node and resume communications with B. New nodes can 
securely join a network as explained later. If a node using K10 
sends a packet to a node using K5, the receiving node will come 
to know that it is using an outdated key. So it will join the 
network again. 
Key Distribution 
The key server generates the key to be used by all the nodes 
in the cluster. Care must be taken while the key is distributed 
among all the nodes in the cluster. Hughes’s variant of Diffie-
Hellman algorithm plays an important role here. Hughes’s 
variant of Diffie-Hellman algorithm is susceptible to Man-in-
the-middle attack. So we use Hughes’s variant of Diffie-
Hellman algorithm with Encrypted Key Exchange (HDH-
EKE). The key server will generate and broadcast a random 
number  Counter. All the nodes will generate a one time 
password P’ using one-way function F, i.e., P’= F (Counter, P). 
This way we protect P and never directly use P. 
The key server will initiate the HDH-EKE individually with 
all its neighbors. The neighboring nodes will carry on the 
process and will establish communication with other nodes. 
This process will continue until all the nodes in the cluster have 
established one to one communication with some neighboring 
node. This way every node will have the key, which is common 
to the cluster. After key distribution the nodes can use this key 
for encryption or decryption (symmetric key) using RC5 
algorithm. 
Figure 2 shows how HDH-EKE protocol works. Suppose A 
is a key server and it wants to pass the key to node B. 
 
Figure 2.   Hughes’s variant of Diffie-Hellman algorithm with Encrypted Key 
Exchange. Key server A generates the key K and passes it to sensor node B 
securely 
1.  A will generate a random number x. It will compute 
the key K=g
x %n and send a start message to B. 
2.  B will generate a random number y. It will compute 
the number g
y %n. It will send this number 
unencrypted to A. 
3.  After receiving g
y %n from B, A will compute g
xy 
%n. It will encrypt that number with P’. It will 
generate a random number RA and will encrypt it 
with K. It will concatenate these two encrypted 
numbers (EP’(g
xy %n) | EK(RA)) and will send to B. 
4.  Since B has P’ it can decrypt  EP’(g
xy %n). It 
computes the key K=g
x %n. K is the key that A and B 
will use for encryption and decryption. After 
computing K it can decrypt EK(RA). Then it generates 
a random number RB and sends EK(RA | RB) to A. 
5.  A will decrypt the message EK(RA | RB) and will send 
EK(RB) to B. 
6.  B will receive EK(RB) and decrypt it to check against 
its local RB. HDH-EKE protocol is now complete. 
 
 
HDH-EKE will survive Man-in-the-middle attack. The 
purpose of random numbers RA  and RB  is to provide 2-way 
authentication. It takes 5 messages to transmit a key to one 
node. For n nodes it takes Θ(n) messages. Key distribution 
takes place only initially when nodes are deployed. After that 
all the subsequent keys are generated locally. C.  Signatures 
Encryption using the common key K ensures Data 
Confidentiality. With HDH-EKE we distribute K securely 
which is used for encryption and decryption. For a secure 
communication only encryption is not sufficient. Another 
building block of DSPS, Signatures provides us a secure 
channel of communication. 
Every packet has a signature consisting of five fields: 
source-id, receiver-id, session, counter and CRC. 
Signature = (source-id, receiver-id, session, counter, CRC) 
Signature is also encrypted along with the data using 
common key K. A signature can be used for both unicast and 
broadcast packets. The purpose of signature is to distinguish 
packets from one another for an entire lifetime of the network. 
If two nodes are communicating i.e. they are sending messages 
back and forth, we call that as a session. In one session there 
can be one or more packets sent. A counter is a packet index in 
a particular session. Counter distinguishes packets in the same 
session. The sender will start a session with a counter value 1 
and will end it with a counter value -1. If there is only one 
packet in a session then the counter value will be –1. Each node 
will have one table. Each record in the table has five fields, 
which are node-id, unicast session, unicast counter, broadcast 
session and broadcast counter. See table 1 for an example of 
the table at node B and what these fields imply. 
 
Node-id Unicast 
Session 
Unicast 
Counter  
Broadcast 
Session 
Broadcast 
Counter 
C 1 0 2 0 
D  2 0 1 2 
E 6 12  0 0 
F 9 23  0 0 
TABLE I.   B’S TABLE SHOWS THAT IT HAD UNICAST SESSIONS WITH C, 
D, E, F AND BROADCAST SESSIONS WITH C, D. AT PRESENT B IS HAVING 
UNICAST SESSION WITH E, F AND BROADCAST SESSION WITH D. 
A receiver keeps track of source-ids and corresponding 
counters for a particular session. When a new packet arrives the 
receiver will decrypt and check the signature of the packet. If 
the receiver-id in the signature matches with its own id (if ids 
don’t match then it will drop the packet) then it will check the 
source-id in the signature against its stored source-ids. If it does 
not find an entry for that source then it will add the source-id to 
the table. If it finds an entry then it will check the counter, 
which should be smaller than the counter in the signature. If so 
it will replace the counter with the counter in the signature. If 
the counter is –1 then the node will reset the counter for the 
corresponding entry. 
We next describe various scenarios of WSN that are 
addressed by DSPS. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
I. 
Critical Transactions 
If two nodes want to perform some critical transaction then 
one of them will generate the key. It will then pass the key to 
the other node using HDH-EKE. The key will be used only for 
that transaction and will be discarded after the critical 
transaction is performed. 
New Node Can Join 
For a new node to join it must have the trusted secret 
password P. The new node will send a request to any node in a 
cluster that it wants to join. The node in the cluster will send a 
random number Counter to the new node. The new node can 
compute P’ using one-way function as P’= F (Counter, P). Now 
they have a common number P’. So they can perform HDH-
EKE as explained above. The new node will get the current key 
and will become a part of the cluster and thus the WSN. 
Intercluster Movement of Nodes 
DSPS supports intercluster movement of nodes. The nodes 
can freely move within a cluster as they have the common key 
K. Hence, intercluster movement requires no extra work for 
security. 
Intracluster Movement of Nodes 
DSPS supports intracluster movement of nodes. When a 
node leaves cluster C1 it will delete the key of the cluster C1. 
To join cluster C2 it needs the key of cluster C2. So it is like a 
new node joining a cluster. DSPS supports joining of new node 
provided it has the trusted secret password P. 
Nodes Common to two or more Clusters 
DSPS supports nodes that are common to two or more 
clusters. Those nodes will have keys of all the clusters they 
belong. Key change may occur at slightly different time in 
neighboring clusters. Before forwarding a packet from cluster 
C1 to cluster C2, sensor nodes will first decrypt packet with 
key of C1 and then encrypt with key of C2. 
Packets floating during Key Distribution 
The nodes will buffer these packets. They will decrypt with 
the previous key, encrypt with the new key and will forward it. 
The above building blocks of the proposed DSPS protocol 
achieve the required security properties of WSN as follows: 
•  Data Confidentiality: The use of HDH-EKE during the 
setup phase and use of a robust symmetric key 
cryptographic algorithm (such as RC5) makes sure that 
there is a secure communication among the nodes in 
the cluster. 
•  Data Authentication: The encrypted signature with the 
data has a source-id, which guarantees authentication. 
DSPS does not provide broadcast authentication. Since 
DSPS relies on changing keys of a cryptographic 
algorithm periodically, adversary cannot become a part 
of a network.  
•  Data Integrity: The CRC in the signature makes sure 
that the message is not modified. Since the signature is 
encrypted it assures data integrity. 
•  Data Freshness: The session and counter in the 
signature together contribute weak data freshness. The receiver anticipates the session and counter in the 
signature of the incoming packet. If the session is 
higher than the current one then weak freshness is 
obtained. If the session is same as the current one then, 
it will check the counter.  A greater counter value in 
the signature ensures weak data freshness. DSPS also 
assures that an appropriate receiver receives the packet. 
This prevents some kind of Denial of Service [8] 
attacks. 
VI. 
VII. 
VIII. 
ADVANTAGES OF DSPS 
The following are some of the advantages of DSPS: 
•  Clock or time synchronization is not required. 
•  It does not assume any specific communication pattern 
(for e.g. node to base station). So it will work 
efficiently with any routing protocol. 
•  It will perform better when there is more node-to-node 
interaction. So it supports collaboration among nodes 
more easily. 
•  Easy to implement and change according to the 
application. 
•  Supports intercluster and intracluster movement of 
nodes. 
•  New nodes can securely join the sensornet. 
•  With periodic resetting of keys, an adversary cannot 
become part of a network permanently, i.e. if at all 
possible, security breach is localized within a cluster 
and after the current epoch expires, an adversary can be 
detected during the key setup phase. 
 
COMPARISION WITH SPINS 
DSPS differs from SPINS in the following ways: 
1.  SPINS assumes some specific communication 
patterns, whereas DSPS does not. 
2.  SPINS needs nodes to be loosely time synchronized. 
DSPS does not require time synchronization. 
3.  DSPS uses same encryption key for an entire cluster.  
4.  A compromised key will compromise the whole 
cluster till the next key is set up in case of DSPS. In 
SPINS a compromised key only compromises one 
node. 
5.  DSPS allows periodic resetting of keys. So an 
adversary cannot become part of a network 
permanently. SPINS does not allow that. 
6.  SPINS provides broadcast authentication whereas 
DSPS does not. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We designed a security protocol for wireless sensor 
networks, which is distributed in nature. It does not assume any 
communication pattern. It does not require nodes to be time-
synchronized. It supports node mobility and scalability. DSPS 
is easy to implement and modifiable depending on the 
application and it will work efficiently with any routing 
protocol. Our future work involves efficient and optimized 
implementations of DSPS on sensornets of Berkeley motes [2] 
using TinyOS and NesC and other sensornet platforms. 
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